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Abstract
Although the statistical tools most often used by researchers in the field of psychology over the last 25
years are based on frequentist statistics, it is often claimed that the alternative Bayesian approach to
statistics is gaining in popularity. In the current article, we investigated this claim by performing the very
first systematic review of Bayesian psychological articles published between 1990 and 2015 (n  1,579).
We aim to provide a thorough presentation of the role Bayesian statistics plays in psychology. This
historical assessment allows us to identify trends and see how Bayesian methods have been integrated
into psychological research in the context of different statistical frameworks (e.g., hypothesis testing,
cognitive models, IRT, SEM, etc.). We also describe take-home messages and provide “big-picture”
recommendations to the field as Bayesian statistics becomes more popular. Our review indicated that
Bayesian statistics is used in a variety of contexts across subfields of psychology and related disciplines.
There are many different reasons why one might choose to use Bayes (e.g., the use of priors, estimating
otherwise intractable models, modeling uncertainty, etc.). We found in this review that the use of Bayes
has increased and broadened in the sense that this methodology can be used in a flexible manner to tackle
many different forms of questions. We hope this presentation opens the door for a larger discussion
regarding the current state of Bayesian statistics, as well as future trends.
Translational Abstract
Over 250 years ago, Bayes (or Price, or Laplace) introduced a method to take prior knowledge into
account in data analysis. Although these ideas and Bayes’s theorem have been longstanding within the
fields of mathematics and statistics, these tools have not been at the forefront of modern-day applied
psychological research. It was frequentist statistics (i.e., p values and null hypothesis testing; developed
by Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson long after Bayes’s theorem), which has dominated the field of
Psychology throughout the 21st century. However, it is often claimed by ‘Bayesians’ that the alternative
Bayesian approach to statistics is gaining in popularity. In the current article, we investigated this claim
by performing the very first systematic review of Bayesian psychological articles published between
1990 and 2015 (n  1,579). Our findings showed that there was some merit in this thought. In fact, the
use of Bayesian methods in applied Psychological work has steadily increased since the nineties and is
currently taking flight. It was clear in this review that Bayesian statistics is used in a variety of contexts
across subfields of Psychology and related disciplines. This is an exciting time, where we can watch the
field of applied statistics change more than ever before. The way in which researchers think about and
answer substantive inquiries is slowly taking on a new philosophical meaning that now incorporates
previous knowledge and opinions into the estimation process. We hope this presentation opens the door
for a larger discussion regarding the current state of Bayesian statistics, as well as future trends.
Keywords: Bayes’s theorem, prior, posterior, MCMC-methods, systematic review
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/met0000100.supp
Rens van de Schoot, Department of Methods and Statistics, Utrecht University,
and Optentia Research Program, Faculty of Humanities, North-West University;
Sonja D. Winter, Oisín Ryan, and Mariëlle Zondervan-Zwijnenburg, Department
of Methods and Statistics, Utrecht University; Sarah Depaoli, Department of
Psychological Sciences, University of California, Merced.
The first author was supported by a grant from the Netherlands organi-
zation for scientific research: NWO-VIDI-452-14-006. Preliminary results
were presented during the 7th Mplus Users Meeting organized at Utrecht
University, the Netherlands; during the 2016-edition of the European Stats
Camp organized by Yhat Enterprises, LLC; and during the 2016-edition of
the Mplus Utrecht Summer School.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Rens van de
Schoot, Department of Methods and Statistics, Utrecht University, P.O. Box






































































































Psychological Methods © 2017 American Psychological Association
2017, Vol. 22, No. 2, 217–239 1082-989X/17/$12.00 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/met0000100
217
. . . whereas the 20th century was dominated by NHST, the 21st
century is becoming Bayesian (as forecast by Lindley . . .).
—(Kruschke, 2011, p. 272)
Over 250 years ago, Richard Price published an article written
by Thomas Bayes on inverse probability (Bayes & Price, 1763),
and just over 200 years ago Simon-Pierre Laplace published the
theorem that we now recognize as Bayes’s theorem (Laplace,
1814). Bayesian methods implement Bayes’s theorem, which
states that the data moderate prior beliefs regarding the model
parameters, and this process produces updated beliefs about model
parameters. The choice of a prior is based on how much informa-
tion we believe we have preceding data collection, as well as how
accurate we believe that information to be. Within Bayesian sta-
tistics, priors can come from any source; for example, a meta-
analysis, a clinical study or, in the absence of empirical data,
expert consensus.
Although the ideas of inverse probability and Bayes’s theorem
have been longstanding within mathematics, these tools have not
been at the forefront of modern-day applied statistics. Applications
of Bayesian statistics in psychology date back at least to Edwards,
Lindman, and Savage (1963). However, frequentist statistics (i.e.,
p values and null hypothesis testing; developed by Fisher, Ney-
man, and Pearson long after Bayes’s theorem), have dominated the
field of psychology throughout the 21st century. In contrast to the
Bayesian paradigm, frequentist statistics associate probability with
long-run frequency. The most often used example of long-run
frequency is the notion of an infinite coin toss: A sample space of
possible outcomes (heads and tails) is enumerated, and the prob-
ability of an outcome represents the proportion of the particular
outcome divided by the total number of coin tosses. In contrast, the
Bayesian paradigm does not carry this notion of long-run fre-
quency. Rather, the Bayesian framework uses prior information
and updates this information with new data. For a philosophical
discussion on these topics, we refer the interested reader to:
Gelman and Shalizi (2013); Haig (2009); Kennedy (2014); McFall
and Treat (1999); Morey and Rouder (2011); or Wagenmakers,
Lee, Lodewyckx, and Iverson (2008).
A steady increase in the popularity of Bayesian statistics has
been noted in systematic reviews conducted outside of psychology.
For example, in the field of organizational science, Kruschke
(2010) found 42 articles published in 15 different journals between
2001 and 2010 applying Bayesian statistics. Rupp, Dey, and
Zumbo (2004) discussed 12 Bayesian applications of IRT models
(although these were not necessarily field-specific). Spiegelhalter,
Myles, Jones, and Abrams (2000) identified 30 Bayesian applica-
tion articles published in the field of health technology assessment
between 1973 and1998. Rietbergen (2016) focused on the use and
reporting of Bayesian methods in 12 epidemiological and medical
journals between 2005 and 2013. She found a total of 86 articles
and subsequently reported that several of the articles presented
incomplete Method and Results sections. Finally, Ashby (2006)
wrote a literature review on Bayesian statistics in medicine span-
ning from 1982 to 2006. She concluded that Bayesian statistics
have pervaded all major areas of medical statistics; including, for
example clinical trials, epidemiology, spatial modeling, and mo-
lecular genetics. These findings are supported by an initial search
on Scopus with the search word “Bayesian” (excluding “Bayesian
information criterion”). The results of which are shown in Figure
1; here we can see a steep increase of Bayesian articles over time
in many different disciplines.
In the current article, we investigate Kruschke’s claim that “the
21st century is becoming Bayesian” by performing a systematic
Figure 1. Initial search on Scopus with the search word “Bayesian” in the title, abstract, or keywords
(excluding “Bayesian Information Criterion”). STEM  Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics.






































































































218 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
review of Bayesian articles published in the field of psychology.
We have two aims with our review: (a) to investigate usage
patterns of Bayesian statistics within the field of psychology, and
(b) to identify trends over time regarding the use of Bayesian
statistics in psychology. To address this latter aim, we detail
growth patterns within many different subcategories, including the
use of Bayes with different statistical techniques and the use in
different subfields of psychology. This aim is informative with
regards to the past and current patterns of Bayes usage within
psychology, and it is our hope that many different insights can be
drawn from this information regarding the presence of Bayesian
statistics within the field. We also describe take-home messages
and provide “big-picture” recommendations to the field as Bayes-
ian statistics (presumably) becomes more popular within the psy-
chological literature.
Next, we describe the procedure used for our systematic review,
followed by the numeric results. Then we elaborate on trends we
identified in the Bayesian psychological literature. Based on our
findings, we provide some best practices and recommendations for
future research in the Discussion section. We provide detailed
supplementary materials: (a) A list of all articles we found in the
systematic review, including our categorization; (b) A list of
journals that have published Bayesian articles; (c) A list of tutorial
articles; (d) Examples of empirical articles that can be used as
inspiration for how to report Bayesian methods and results, and (e)
All of the information needed to reproduce our systematic search.
Method
Step 1: Search Strategy
The search for Bayesian applications was based on the Scopus
database of articles published between 1990 and 2015. Articles
eligible for inclusion mentioned “Bayesian,” “Gibbs sampler,”
“MCMC,” “prior distribution,” or “posterior distribution” in the
title, abstract, or keywords. Note that the MCMC estimation algo-
rithm can be used for Bayesian or frequentist estimation. However,
in the current article, we refer to the cases where the MCMC
estimation algorithm is implemented in conjunction with observed
data, and a prior, in order to sample from the posterior distribution
of a particular model parameter. The articles we identified were
published in a peer-reviewed journal with “psychology” listed in
Scopus as at least one of the journal’s topics; however, the topic of
the article could have also included: “arts and humanities,” “busi-
ness,” “decision sciences,” “economics,” or “sociology.” Articles
that mentioned “Bayesian information criterion” as the sole refer-
ence to the use of Bayesian statistics were excluded in the search.
All steps used for identifying articles are detailed below and in the
PRISMA flowchart presented in Figure 2. The exact search terms
we used in Scopus can be found in the online supplementary
material, including the search used to construct Figure 1 and a file
containing references for all of the identified articles.
Step 2: Initial Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
After all relevant articles were identified, duplicates were ex-
cluded, followed by any document-types that were not peer-
reviewed articles and were returned by Scopus in error. In addi-
tion, the search still extracted some articles solely using the term
“Bayesian information criterion” (BIC), despite the exclusion term
specified in our search. These articles were screened and excluded
from further analysis. The initial screening of the articles was done
based on information provided in the abstract. If classification
remained unclear after reading the abstract, then we downloaded
the full article to further assess classification. Any inaccessible
articles were searched for multiple times through various methods
(i.e., ResearchGate, Google Scholar). The first authors of the
inaccessible articles (n  18) were contacted via a last-known
e-mail address. Of those, three articles were found at a later time
and 10 were obtained directly from the first author. Thus, in the
Records idenfied through Scopus 
database search 1 
(n = 1,122) 
Records idenfied through Scopus 
database search 2 
(n =547) 
Records aer exact duplicates (n=5) removed 
(n =1,664) 
Full-text arcles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n =  1,664) 
Inaccessible aer 
contacng authors (n = 5) 
Foreign Language arcles 
(n = 21)  
Search term only 
menoned (n = 59) Studies included in review 
(n =   1,579) 
Figure 2. PRISMA flowchart. Search 1 refers to our initial Scopus search (1998–2013 and only the word
“Bayesian”). Search 2 was conducted as part of the review process (extending the number of years and the search






































































































219THE USE OF BAYES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
end, only five articles remained inaccessible. Moreover, articles
not published in English (n  21), or only mentioning Bayes (or
any of the other search terms) somewhere in the article but without
actually using Bayesian methods (n  59), were excluded. These
inclusion criteria left us with 1,579 eligible articles (see Figure 2).
Step 3: Assessment of Bayesian Usage
In the third stage of assessment, the full-text articles were read
and screened for Bayesian content by one of the authors, and then
double-checked by a second author. We identified several catego-
ries representing different types of Bayesian articles.1 When it was
not clear which category an article belonged to, then this was
discussed among the authors until consensus was reached. Follow-
ing the identification and retrieval of eligible articles, we assessed
the manner in which Bayesian statistics was used in order to
identify articles implementing Bayesian methodology.
Step 4: Detecting Trends
Upon the initial categorization, data extracted from the articles
were rereviewed to detect any emerging trends over time.2 Even
though trends could be roughly identified in the abstracts, it was
necessary to read the full text of hundreds of articles in order to
adequately describe these trends. Trend information for each arti-
cle was summarized in Excel files by one of the authors. If
something regarding the trend was not clear, then a second author
read the article to aid in interpretation and identification of trends.
The overall summary written for each article in the Excel files was
thoroughly examined by the first author to ensure consistency
across all summaries.
Results
The results of this screening process for the 1,579 eligible
articles are shown in Table 1. We can see that almost half of the
eligible Bayesian articles made use or mention of a regression-
based statistical model in relation to Bayesian statistics. Here, we
refer to “regression-based” models as the broad class of statistical
models, where regression underlies the composition of the model.
Some examples of regression-based models in the context of this
article are: regression analysis, analysis of variance (ANOVA),
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), structural equation modeling
(SEM), item response theory (IRT), and multilevel modeling. All
of these articles used MCMC techniques (e.g., Gibbs sampling or
Metropolis Hastings) to estimate model parameters. These types of
regression-based models differ from, for example, machine learn-
ing techniques, which may not contain regression elements in the
statistical process.
Of these regression-based articles, we identified four distinct
categories. The breakdown of each of these article types is shown
in Table 2. “Empirical” articles were defined as those utilizing
Bayesian methods in the analysis of real data in order to answer a
substantive research question. “Tutorial” articles (see the online
supplementary material for a full list) were defined as step-by-step
explanations of the use of Bayesian statistics meant for new users
of the method. Note that we do not claim to have included all
possible tutorials published about Bayesian analyses because many
of these have presumably been published outside of the field of
psychology. “Simulation” articles were defined as simulation stud-
ies introducing and assessing a new technique using Bayesian
MCMC methods. “Theoretical/technical” articles were defined as
those only using formulae or mathematical proofs, with more
technical details than tutorial articles and with a target audience of
methodologists/statisticians. In the Trends section we discuss the
articles in these categories in great detail. While reading the
regression-based Bayesian articles, we also found some secondary
categories, which include “Bayesian Meta-Analysis” and “Com-
mentary” articles, but because these are only small categories we
refrain from discussing them in detail. However, we do include
them in Table 2 for reference.
We can see from Table 1 that there are two other sizable
categories which we identified: “Bayes as cognition/learning” and
“Computational model.” The former refers to articles that discuss
Bayesian statistics, but only as a model explaining human percep-
tion or reasoning. In addition, the latter category contains articles
using Bayesian statistics to explain how humans reason (see, e.g.,
Albert, 2000), or articles modeling cognition using a Bayesian
computation model—that is, a task was set and a model was
defined, which attempted to imitate a human “Bayesian” thinker in
overcoming or assessing the task (see, e.g., Kemp & Tenenbaum,
2009). These should be seen as categories that apply Bayesian
methods in cognitive psychology, even if the application is made
in slightly different ways. In the Trends section, we discuss these
two categories in great detail.
Furthermore, 77 articles were concerned with Bayes Networks
analysis, which are part of the family of probabilistic graphical
models (PGMs). Each node in a Bayesian network represents a
random variable, while each connecting line represents a probabi-
listic dependency between random variables. A PGM is called a
Bayes Net when the graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), that
is, a graph where it is impossible to form a cycle between random
variables. Bayes nets are applied in many fields, such as education
(Almond, DiBello, Moulder, & Zapata-Rivera, 2007), social psy-
1 When we started the review we first screened the articles published in
1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013 and we determined categories during this
phase. Next, these categories were applied toward the rest of the review,
and new categories were added as we saw new developments emerge in the
field. For example, the “theoretical/simulation/empirical” classification
was made a priori, the only change being meta-analysis which was taken
out of the empirical category and made its own category, commentary
articles were initially classified tutorial articles, and the human/nonhuman
subclassification was added later.
2 We thank the editor for helping us detect trends.
Table 1
Breakdown of Bayesian Usage in 1,579 Eligible Articles
in Subcategories
Use of Bayesian statistics N %
Regression-based 740 46.9
Bayesian methods in cognitive psychology
Bayes as cognition/learning 456 28.9
Computational model 175 11.1
Bayesian network 77 4.9
Direct application of Bayes theorem 54 3.4
Speech/image recognition 46 2.9
Machine learning 18 1.1






































































































220 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
chology (Krivitsky, Handcock, Raftery, & Hoff, 2009), cognitive
psychology (Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013), and neuroscience
(Zhang et al., 2015). Even though the term “Bayesian Network”
was first used by Judea Pearl in 1985 (Pearl, 1985), and we were
able to find applications as early as 1993 (Eizirik, Barbosa, &
Mendes, 1993), our review shows that it is only after the turn of the
21st century that Bayesian Networks started to play a role in the
field of psychology.
Finally, there are some smaller categories we identified during
our search. One such category contains articles that used Bayesian
models in relation to speech or image recognition. These articles
included theoretical models of human speech or image recognition,
as well as computational models for image and speech recognition
(e.g., Yu & Huang, 2003). Another small category deals solely
with Bayes Factors, which are calculated from the ratio of BICs for
two models, as described by Kass and Raftery (1995; see, for
example, Cipora & Nuerk, 2013). Other small categories contain
articles in the areas of Bayesian model averaging (e.g., Wasser-
man, 2000), or machine learning (e.g., Garrard, Rentoumi, Gesi-
erich, Miller, & Gorno-Tempini, 2014). Finally, there is a category
of articles where Bayes’ formula is directly applied by analytically
deriving the posterior through “simply” filling in Bayes’s theorem
with exact values; some articles also calculated the likelihood
without sampling. Such articles are labeled in Table 1 as “Direct
application of Bayes theorem.” Examples of these applications
directly solving Bayes’s theorem include Allen and Iacono (1997)
and Morrell, Taylor, Quine, Kerr, and Western (1994). More
recently, Bayes’ formula has been applied as a way to compute
standard measures of sensitivity, specificity, posterior predictive
values, and accurate differentiation of a certain measure; some
examples include Tondo, Visioli, Preti, and Baldessarini (2014)
and Serra et al. (2015). In the earlier articles in our sample, the use
of direct application can be explained by the fact that there were
not many statistical tools available for assessing data through
Bayesian methods (i.e., the Gibbs sampler and other similar sam-
pling methods were not yet available). Because these smaller
categories contained too few articles to gather trends from, we
refrain from describing them any further.
Trends
This section shows a detailed breakdown of the role Bayes has
played in different areas of statistics implemented within psychol-
ogy (as defined by Scopus). Throughout the review process, we
have identified several different categories of published Bayesian
articles. Within and across these categories, there were many
interesting trends. Within these trends, we mainly focused on how
results from technical/simulation articles started to influence ap-
plied articles. We present these trends next, and every subsection
also describes take-home messages and provides “big-picture”
recommendations as Bayesian statistics (presumably) becomes
more popular within psychology (see italicized text at the end of
each subsection for these messages).
The Use of Bayesian Estimation Over the Years
As can be seen in Figure 3, not only has the absolute number of
articles using Bayesian statistics increased (Figure 3A), but the
proportion of Bayesian articles relative to the total number of
articles has also increased (Figure 3B).3 Figure 3C presents all
articles included in our review split over nine categories, which
range from regression-based articles to machine learning. Figure
3D focuses our attention specifically on regression-based articles.
Within this category, we see that after a slow start, empirical
articles have taken flight and are currently the most frequently
published article type. Theoretical and simulation articles were
relatively more prevalent earlier in this field, but these types of
articles do not show growth quite as explosively compared to
empirical articles. Notably, the first empirical applications (ac-
cording to our definition) were not published until the year 2000
(Smith, Kohn, & Mathur, 2000; Verguts & De Boeck, 2000).4
Each of these earliest examples used Bayesian statistics as a tool to
solve computation problems with complex models.
In conclusion, the use of Bayesian methods is indeed increasing
in absolute and relative numbers, and empirical regression-based
applications are especially taking flight.
“Bayesian” Journals
The 1,579 articles identified in our systematic review were
published in 269 different journals. However, 50% of all articles
were published in just 19 of these journals. A total overview of
journals that have published Bayesian work can be found in the
online material; this is a good resource for the types of journals
open to publishing applied Bayesian inquiries. In what follows, we
describe several additional trends found in our review.
JCR Subject Categories
In Table 3 we list journals with 10 or more Bayesian publica-
tions since 1990 (n  37) in order to exclude journals that only
sporadically publish a Bayesian article. We extracted subject cat-
egory, impact factor, and ranking from the JCR Social Science
Edition, 2014 database. As Table 3 shows, a great majority of the
3 To create these figures, we first searched Scopus for the word “Bayes-
ian” and only included psychology articles. Next, we searched Scopus for
an empty string, again only including psychology articles, to approximate
the total number of articles published in psychology per year. For more
information, please refer to the online supplementary materials.
4 Although it could be argued that articles such as Hoijtink and Molenaar
(1997) or Arminger and Muthén (1998) are empirical articles, we only
defined an article as “empirical” if the main research question was a
substantive question and the introduction section was focused on the
underlying substantive theories being examined.
Table 2
Breakdown of Article Types in 740 Eligible
Regression-Based Articles
Use of Bayesian statistics N %
Empirical
Sample is human 167 22.6











































































































221THE USE OF BAYES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
37 journals ranked in the top 50% (n  31) of journals of at least
one of their assigned subject categories; 19 fell in the top 25%.5 In
the category “mathematical psychology,” three of the top four
journals regularly publish Bayesian articles, namely: Psychonomic
Bulletin and Review (1st), Behavior Research Methods (2nd), and
British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology (4th).
Table 4 presents an overview of the JCR subject categories
related to the subfield of psychology where the articles reported in
Table 3 were published. Based on the absolute number of journals,
“experimental psychology” is the most popular subject category,
where 18 out of 85 journals regularly publish Bayesian articles.
However, based on the percentage of journals within a category,
“mathematical psychology” has the highest percentage (38.46%)
of journals in this subject area publishing Bayesian articles. If we
focus exclusively on journals categorized within psychology, areas
less influenced by Bayesian methods are: “biological,” “develop-
mental,” “general,” and “social psychology.” Two JCR categories
were completely absent: “psychology, clinical” and “psychology,
psychoanalysis.” However, our search showed that there are many
more journals with less than 10 articles published (232 journals),
which could potentially fall within these subfields of psychology.
As we will see later when we discuss the topic areas of empirical
regression-based articles, there are many developmental and edu-
cational articles published. However, these are not often published
within the specialized journals in the respective categories, or they
are published in journals that are still new to accepting Bayesian
publications (i.e., those that have published fewer than 10 Bayes-
ian articles).
Based on our results, it seems that there are journals within
most areas of psychology that are open to publishing studies based
on Bayesian analysis, and many of these journals rank high within
their respective subfields.
5 It is interesting to note that JCR categorizes some of these journals
outside of the field of psychology, and sometimes even outside of the social
sciences. This is at odds with Scopus, which categorized all of our included
articles as “psychology”.
Figure 3. Evolution of articles using Bayesian statistics in the field of psychology (A and B) divided over







































































































222 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
Table 3
Journals That Published at Least 10 Bayesian Publications in the Field of Psychology Since 1990: 1,056 Articles out of a Total of










1. Psychometrika 111 Social sciences, mathematical
methods
22/46 1.085 4.176 1.021
2. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 70 Social sciences, mathematical
methods
4/46 2.609 4.176 1.021
3. Applied Psychological Measurement 68 Social sciences, mathematical
methods
20/46 1.178 4.176 1.021
4. Frontiers in Psychology 63 Psychology, multidisciplinary 23/129 2.56 21.81 1.015
5. Psychological Review 57 Psychology, multidisciplinary 5/129 7.972 21.81 1.015
6. Cognitive Science 55 Psychology, experimental 30/85 2.446 21.965 2.009
7. Cognition 54 Psychology, experimental 9/85 3.479 21.965 2.009
8. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 36 Psychology, mathematical 1/13 3.369 3.369 1.178
Psychology, experimental 12/85 3.369 21.965 2.009
9. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 33 Neurosciences2 85/252 3.626 31.427 2.791
Psychology2 13/76 3.626 21.81 2.03
10. British Journal of Mathematical and
Statistical Psychology
32 Psychology, mathematical 4/13 2.167 3.369 1.178
Psychology, experimental 38/85 2.167 21.965 2.009
11. Psychological Methods 30 Psychology, multidisciplinary 6/129 7.338 21.81 1.015
12. Educational and Psychological
Measurement 28 Psychology, educational 30/55 1.154 4.061 1.308
13. Cognitive Processing 27 Psychology, experimental 67/85 1.388 21.965 2.009
14. Speech Communication 25 Acoustics2 12/31 1.256 4.924 .912
Computer science, Interdisciplinary
applications2
62/102 1.256 4.925 1.401
15. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning Memory and Cognition 24 Psychology, experimental 23/85 2.862 21.965 2.009
16. Topics in Cognitive Science 24 Psychology, experimental 16/85 3.063 21.965 2.009
17. Multivariate Behavioral Research 22 Social sciences, mathematical
methods
6/46 2.477 4.176 1.021
Psychology, experimental 27/85 2.477 21.965 2.009
18. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General 21 Psychology, experimental 3/85 5.929 21.965 2.009
19. Behavior Research Methods 20 Psychology, mathematical 2/13 2.928 3.369 1.178
Psychology, experimental 20/85 2.928 21.965 2.009
20. Theory and Decision 20 Economics 192/333 .72 6.654 .86
Social Sciences, Mathematical
Methods
36/46 .72 4.176 1.021
21. Decision Support Systems 19 Computer science, artificial
intelligence2
27/123 2.313 8.746 1.406
Computer science, information
systems2
16/139 2.313 6.806 .971
Operations research &
management science2
11/81 2.313 4.376 1.079
22. Journal of Educational Measurement 19 Psychology, Educational 36/55 .922 4.061 1.308
Psychology, Applied 44/76 .922 6.071 1.205
Psychology, Mathematical 11/13 .922 3.369 1.178
23. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 Psychology, Biological 1/14 20.771 20.771 1.917
24. Journal of Classification 18 Psychology, Mathematical 12/13 .727 3.369 1.178
25. Computer Speech and Language 16 Computer science, artificial
intelligence2
47/123 1.753 8.746 1.406
26. Thinking and Reasoning 15 Psychology, Experimental 34/85 2.2 21.965 2.009
27. Technological Forecasting and
Social Change 14 Business 31/115 2.058 7.475 1.4
28. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes
13 Psychology, Applied 13/76 2.201 6.071 1.205
Psychology, Social 15/62 2.201 6.692 1.522
Management 38/185 2.201 7.769 1.208
29. Psychological Science 13 Psychology, multidisciplinary 11/129 4.94 21.81 1.015
30. Acta Psychologica 12 Psychology, experimental 31/85 2.248 21.965 2.009
31. Perception 12 Psychology, experimental 74/85 .906 21.965 2.009
32. Psychological Bulletin 12 Psychology, multidisciplinary 3/129 14.756 21.81 1.015
33. Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology 12 Psychology, experimental 36/85 2.127 21.965 2.009
34. Developmental Science 11 Psychology, developmental 7/68 3.808 7.26 1.728







































































































223THE USE OF BAYES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
Psychometrika and Open Access Journals
Another trend became apparent as we inspected the journals by
decade. In the 1990s, Bayesian articles were published in 64
different journals, with Psychometrika as the major contributor
(17.8%). In the 2000s, the dominance of Psychometrika decreased
to 9.2% (although still first place), and a wider variety of journals
(n  139) published Bayesian articles. In the last 5 years (2011–
2015), 191 different journals published Bayesian articles. In addi-
tion, there was a shift in the journal-type that published the most
Bayesian work during this time, with the top five journals (in
order): Frontiers in Psychology (6.8%), Journal of Mathematical
Psychology (4.8%), Cognition (4.1%), Psychometrika (4%), and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience is (3.5%).
Based on our review, it appears that the landscape of journals
open for Bayesian articles is changing, and that more substantive
and open access journals (i.e., the Frontiers journals) are becom-
ing popular Bayesian outlets.
Zooming in on Psychological Methods
An important journal for Bayesian publications is Psychological
Methods, because this journal has broad appeal (and impact) to
methodologists, as well as applied psychological researchers. We
also highlight this journal because it is an important contributor to
Bayesian statistics, especially with the current special issue dedi-
cated solely to this topic.
We present publication rates and citation counts from 1996–
2015 for this journal in Table 5 (the Journal was founded in 1996).
There appears to be a steady increase in the number of Bayesian
articles (according to Scopus) being published in Psychological
Methods. From 1996–2008, only 5 of the 13 years had Bayesian
articles published. However, from 2009–2015, every year has seen
at least one Bayesian article published. This suggests that Bayesian
statistics is starting to have a more consistent presence in Psycho-
logical Methods.
It is not surprising to see that older articles have received more
citations compared with those only more recently published. For
example, articles published in 1996–2005 tend to have higher
citation counts compared to articles published in the last 5 years.
Note that the current ISI Impact Factor for Psychological Methods
is 7.338. We used the JCR database to retrieve the total number of
citations for articles published in Psychological Methods. This
information was available for the years 2009–2013. We used Web
of Science, a search engine from the same company as JCR, to
extract the number of articles published per year and the number of
citations for articles included in our review. Table 5 shows that 4
of the 5 years for which comparisons were possible, Bayesian
articles received more citations than the journal average. The
exception is 2013, where the journal average is 4.27, but Bayesian
articles only received 3.86 citations on average.
Aside from citation and publication rates, we also want to note
the types of articles being published specifically in Psychological
Methods. Of the 32 Bayesian articles published since 2000, 20 (or
62.5%) of these articles included a simulation component. The
remaining 12 articles introduced new methods and often included
an example component to illustrate the method(s) being intro-
duced. There was no trend of time relating to the type of article











35. Memory and Cognition 11 Psychology, experimental 29/85 2.457 21.965 2.009
36. Social Science and Medicine 11 Social sciences, biomedical 4/39 2.89 5.288 1.311
Public, environmental and
occupational health
16/147 2.89 10.042 1.372
37. Social Networks 10 Anthropology 14/84 2 4.553 .69
Sociology 8/142 2 4.39 .783
Note. Some journals carry more than one subject category.
1 All Impact Factors based on 2014. Max and median impact factors are all within their respective category. 2 These journals were not part of the JCR
Social Science Edition, 2014, but were instead included in the JCR Science Edition, 2014.
Table 4
Overview of Distribution of Journals Over ISI Web of Knowledge Categories
Category
Total # of journals
with 10 publications
Total # of journals
in category Percentage
Psychology, experimental 16 85 18.82%
Psychology, mathematical 5 13 38.46%
Psychology, multidisciplinary 5 129 3.88%
Social sciences, mathematical methods 5 46 10.87%
Psychology, educational 2 55 3.64%
Psychology applied 2 76 2.63%
Psychology, biological 1 14 7.14%
Psychology, social 1 62 1.61%
Psychology, developmental 1 68 1.47%






































































































224 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
frequently published in the earlier years compared with the more
recent years.
Overall, Psychological Methods tends to publish a relatively
high proportion of articles that are not based on Bayesian statis-
tics. However, we can see that the proportion of Bayesian articles
(mainly simulation-based) may be on the rise and carry a larger
impact compared with non-Bayesian articles.
Trends Within Regression-Based Models
Because regression-based articles represent the largest statistical
category of our search (see Table 1), we devote an entire section
to these articles.
Technical/Theoretical Articles
Any time a new statistical tool or method finds its way into
a field, there are typically many technical or theoretical articles
written about that tool. In a subsequent section, we also de-
scribe the transfer of knowledge obtained from the technical
articles to simulation articles (where the new method is tested
against alternative methods), as well as to the “real” applica-
tions. Here, we highlight the main themes of the technical
articles on Bayesian statistics within psychology. We identified
172 articles introducing Bayesian statistics as a new method of
estimation. Of these, 29.7% related to item response theory
(IRT) models, 17.4% related to structural equation models
(SEMs), 13.4% related to multilevel models, 8.7% related to
computerized adaptive testing (CAT), and the remaining arti-
cles related to a variety of other models.
Overall, we can see that there has been a relatively large
number of technical or theoretical articles written within psychol-
ogy that consider Bayesian methods, especially related to some
more advanced modeling frameworks such as IRT or SEM.
Simulation Articles
The majority (60.6%; total n  198) of simulation articles did
not compare Bayesian estimation against other estimators. Rather,
they investigated the performance of a newly proposed Bayesian
method for different types of populations (e.g., de Leeuw &
Klugkist, 2012), compared different MCMC algorithms with each
other (e.g., Arminger & Muthén, 1998), examined different prior
specifications (e.g., Lee & Zhu, 2000), or explored different levels
of missingness/missing data mechanisms (e.g., Song & Lee, 2002).
We found interesting trends within these articles regarding the type
of models being examined. Specifically, 66 articles dealt with IRT
models, 51 examined SEMs (including mixture, nonlinear, multi-
level SEMs, and missing data issues in SEM), and 25 focused
specifically on CAT; the remaining articles varied widely in
model-type and focus.
We also found 78 articles (39.4%) that compared the perfor-
mance of Bayesian methods with other estimation methods—
almost always maximum likelihood estimation (ML). Based on the
abstracts of these articles, 70.5% concluded that Bayesian methods
outperformed the comparison method(s). In the remaining ab-
stracts, it was concluded that the performance of Bayesian methods
was equivalent to the comparison method (14.1%), or it was stated
that it depended on the specific situation (e.g., depending on the
prior specification; 7.7%). In six abstracts, it was concluded that
the Bayesian method performed worse than the comparison
method (7.7%).
In general, Bayesian methods were found to outperform other
estimation methods for many different performance criteria that is,
Table 5










Total % of all articles





















1996 29 0 0
1997 27 0 0
1998 31 0 0
1999 27 0 0
2000 27 1 3.7 43 43.00 43.00
2001 27 0 0
2002 29 2 6.9 3,560 1,780.00 1,780.00
2003 36 0 0
2004 26 1 3.85 23 23.00 23.00
2005 30 1 3.33 54 54.00 54.00
2006 31 0 0
2007 28 1 3.57 5 5.00 5.00
2008 21 0 0
2009 24 2 8.33 85 42.50 42.50 321 13.38
2010 30 4 13.33 53 13.25 12.50 286 9.53
2011 31 3 9.67 37 12.33 8.00 259 8.35
2012 45 3 6.67 118 39.33 20.00 358 7.96
2013 33 7 21.21 27 3.86 4.00 141 4.27
2014 35 4 11.43 24 6.00 .00
2015 32 1 3.13 0 .00 .00






































































































225THE USE OF BAYES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
Type I error rates, power, and producing stable and accurate
coverage rates) across a wide range of statistical models (e.g.,
regression, CAT, IRT, SEM). These findings were especially
relevant when the sample size was small (we discuss the issue of
small samples in a separate subsection), when the model was more
complex (e.g., Wang & Nydick, 2015), or in the situation where
alternative methods were simply not developed yet (e.g., Wollack,
Bolt, Cohen, & Lee, 2002).
Overall, simulation studies are a large part of the regression-
based Bayesian articles, and it is shown that Bayesian estima-
tion typically outperforms other estimation methods. However,
this is not always the case so researchers should be careful
when using Bayesian methods as a “golden” solution to all
modeling issues.
Empirical Regression-Type Articles
In this category, we found 167 empirical articles using MCMC
techniques (e.g., Gibbs sampling or Metropolis Hastings) to esti-
mate model parameters instead of traditional frequentist meth-
ods—that is, in a sense “standard analyses gone Bayesian.”6 We
discuss several aspects of this large group of articles next.
Field. We clustered the articles in topic-fields contributing
to empirical regression-based work. In ranked order, the fields
with Bayesian applied articles in this category were: cognitive psy-
chology (24.6%), health psychology (12.0%), developmental
psychology (10.2%), educational psychology (6.6%), personality psy-
chology (5.4%), neuropsychology (4.2%), and a variety of 26
smaller fields. The discrepancy between these percentages and our
previous discussion on the representation of Bayesian methods
across journals is due to some of these articles being published in
journals that are not traditionally thought of as “developmental” or
“educational.” Rather, they were published in general-topic jour-
nals. An example is Knops, Zitzmann, and McCrink (2013), which
focuses on child development but was published in Frontiers in
Psychology. An additional explanation is that these articles were
published in journals that have not yet published 10 or more
Bayesian articles in the past 25 years, which was one of our criteria
for journal discussion. Examples include: Developmental Psychol-
ogy (five publications, where one was regression-based empirical),
the Journal of Educational Psychology (two publications, both
regression-based empirical), and the Journal of Psychoeducational
Assessment (three publications, all regression-based empirical).
In conclusion, we found applications in many different subfields
within psychology, which indicates that Bayesian analysis is
slowly becoming accepted across the entire field of psychology.
Reasons why researchers use Bayesian statistics. There are
many different reasons provided in the regression-based articles
why Bayesian techniques were used. We have sorted through the
empirical regression-based articles and have identified the main
reasons why Bayesian methods were used. Note that in many
articles various reasons were provided and as such the percentages
reported in this section do not add up to 100%. In 11.4% of all the
article, there was not a clear argument given as to why Bayesian
methods were implemented, or it was just mentioned that previous
literature advised to use Bayes (4.8%).
The first category of reasons for using Bayesian methods is that
researchers may be “forced into” the implementation because
some complex models simply cannot be estimated using other
approaches (as is argued in, e.g., Heeren, Maurage, & Philippot,
2013), or is difficult because of computational problems with ML
or WLS estimation (e.g., Ryoo et al., 2015). Also, computational
burden is mentioned as argument why to use Bayesian estimation
(e.g., Choi, Koh, & Lee, 2008), or researchers faced convergence
issues with maximum likelihood estimation (e.g., Lee, Choi, &
Cho, 2011). At times, models were intractable or not able to be
estimated because of the high dimensional numerical integration
needed for maximum likelihood estimation (e.g., Humphries,
Bruno, Karpievitch, & Wotherspoon, 2015). Bayesian methods
were also used to produce more accurate parameter estimates
compared to conventional methods (e.g., Wilson, Barrineau, But-
ner, & Berg, 2014), or to get around issues of model identification
(e.g., Wilson et al., 2014). These kinds of arguments are mentioned
(as at least one of the reasons) in 27.5% of the empirical
regression-based articles we found in our review. We also found
several articles where the reason to use Bayesian statistics was
because of: violating assumptions in other estimation methods
(e.g., Desmet & Feinberg, 2003; 7.8%), the great modeling flexi-
bility of Bayes (e.g., Jackson, Gucciardi, & Dimmock, 2014;
10.8%), missing data handling (e.g., Bulbulia et al., 2013; 3.6%),
or improved performance for small sample sizes. Specifically,
small samples were mentioned in 14.4% of the empirical articles
and we expand on this further in a separate section below where
we discuss trends across different types of articles (i.e., theoretical,
simulation, and empirical articles).
Another category of reasons reported in the regression-based
articles to use Bayesian estimation is because it is appealing to
incorporate knowledge into the estimation process via priors. The
use of (informative) priors was explicitly mentioned as at least one
of the reasons for selecting Bayes in 12.6% of the articles; this
included the use of subjective priors (e.g., Cavanagh, Wiecki,
Kochar, & Frank, 2014), small-variance priors on cross loadings
(e.g., Golay, Reverte, Rossier, Favez, & Lecerf, 2013), or to test
for approximate measurement invariance through the use of
approximate-zero priors used to deal with noninvariance across
groups (e.g., Bujacz, Vittersø, Huta, & Kaczmarek, 2014).
Researchers may also implement Bayesian methods because of
the model selection tools available within the estimation frame-
work, such as the DIC or the Bayes Factor. Model selection was
reported as at least one of the reasons in 8.4% of the articles, and
the Bayes Factors in 15.6%. Another 6% of the articles reported to
use Bayes Factors as a way to find evidence in support fort the null
hypothesis (e.g., van Ravenzwaaij, Dutilh, & Wagenmakers, 2011)
and 5.4% of the articles tested informative hypothesis (e.g., Wong
& van de Schoot, 2012). We come back to the use of model
selection by means of the DIC and Bayes Factors in a separate
section.
A third category of reasons to use Bayes is because of modeling
uncertainty as part of the statistical model. Eleven articles (6.6%)
explicitly reported using Bayesian statistics to deal with uncer-
6 In this category we also found 37 nonhuman empirical articles (e.g.,
gene data, fMRI data, financial data, etc.), and we decided not to discuss
these articles in detail here because: (a) our main interest was related to the
psychological literature surrounding the study of humans, and (2) we
cannot guarantee that our search included all articles published in these







































































































226 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
tainty (e.g., Foreman, Morton, & Ford, 2009), or because the
posterior has desirable properties to deal with random variables
(9%). And another 7.8% of the articles mentioned using Bayesian
methods because of the advantage of credibility intervals over
confidence intervals (e.g., Lynch, Brown, & Harmsen, 2003).
Related to this, the region of practical equivalence (as argued by,
e.g., Kruschke, 2011) has also been slowly gaining popularity in
the literature (see, e.g., Ahn et al., 2014; Liddell & Kruschke,
2014). In 12.6% of the articles the more intuitive interpretation of
Bayesian results was given as the main argument to use Bayesian
estimation.
In conclusion, a wide range of reasons is provided to use
Bayesian statistics and, moreover, we believe that as Bayesian
analyses become more and more accepted as a standard estima-
tion tool (which we feel they are), researchers will feel less
pressure to justify why Bayesian methods were used.
Bayesian software being implemented. While the Bayesian
statistical program BUGS was already created in 1989,7 the more
familiar (and most popular) version WinBUGS (Lunn, Thomas,
Best, & Spiegelhalter, 2000) was not developed until 1997. Up
until 2012, WinBUGS was by far the most popular Bayesian
program being used in regression-based articles; it was imple-
mented in almost half of all empirical articles up until this point.
During this same time, there was a wide range of software pack-
ages and programs that were cited only once or twice, making
BUGS the clear favorite, see also the software overview presented
in Spiegelhalter et al. (2000). The popularity of WinBUGS has
faded post-2012 with the advent and publicizing of alternative
programs. From 2013–2014, only 8.8% of empirical articles used
WinBUGS, and only 10.0% used it in 2015. Other packages such
as JAGS (Plummer, 2016; 12.3% in 2013–14 and 17.5% in 2015)
and Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015, 22.8% in 2013–2014
and 20.0% in 2015) are becoming much more popular in the
empirical Bayesian literature, with Mplus taking over the leading
position from 2013 onward. We also feel that JASP (Love et al.,
2015), Stan (Carpenter et al., in press; Kruschke, 2014), and
blavaan (Merkle & Rosseel, 2015) are promising new programs
that will gain usage over the coming years. It was perhaps most
striking in our assessment of Bayesian program usage that 22.2%
of the empirical articles we identified did not report software at all.
Overall, the landscape of Bayesian software has changed dras-
tically over the last few years, with more user-friendly programs
now available.
Priors. There were a variety of types of priors used in the
empirical articles. Notably, 31.1% of the articles did not even
discuss the priors implemented. For some of these articles (8.4% of
the total amount), we assume from the text that the reason was that
default priors from the software were implemented. For example,
in software like Mplus and Amos, Bayesian estimation can be
requested without having to manually specify prior distributions.
This feature makes it really easy to use Bayesian methods in these
programs, but many researchers may be unaware that a prior is set
for every parameter by the software and these settings might not
always be valid (see van de Schoot, Broere, Perryck, Zondervan-
Zwijnenburg, & van Loey, 2015 for a detailed discussion). An-
other 24% of the articles discussed the prior superficially, but did
not provide enough information to reproduce the prior settings
(i.e., hyperparameters).
Out of all articles, 45% reported details surrounding the priors,
including hyperparameters. In half of these articles, all of the
prior-related equations were provided. When informative priors
were used, see also next paragraph, 73.3% of the articles reported
the hyperparameter values for each prior. Overall, only 43.1% of
empirical articles reported hyperparameter values. It appeared that
in (at least) 37.7% of these articles, a normally distributed prior
was used and 7.2% used a uniform prior. For the rest of the articles
where we could determine the type of distribution, it appeared that
a wide range of different priors were used (e.g., beta-binomial,
Cauchy, Jeffreys, gamma, Weibull, etc.).
The discussion about the level of informativeness of the prior
varied article-by-article and was only reported in 56.4% of the
articles. It appears that definitions categorizing “informative,”
“mildly/weakly informative,” and “noninformative” priors is not a
settled issue. This became clear when we extracted the information
about how authors refer to their own priors in their articles; see the
word cloud in Figure 4. Note that some authors did mention the
priors and/or hyperparameters but refrained from referring to these
priors with a label stating the level of informativeness (n  11).
Some level of informative priors was used in 26.7% of the
empirical articles. For these articles we feel it is important to report
on the source of where the prior information came from. There-
fore, it is striking that 34.1% of these articles did not report any
information about the source of the prior. The articles that did
report the source, reported sources such as previous research or
data (19.2%), pragmatic or logical reasons (8.4%), expert opinions
(n  2), or the data itself (i.e., Empirical Bayes methods; n  2).
An important technical aspect of specifying priors is whether the
priors are conjugate. Conjugacy is the mathematical property
whereby the combination of the prior distribution with the ob-
served data likelihood yields a posterior distribution of the same
family of distribution as the prior distribution. This ensures that the
posterior has a closed-form expression, which simplifies estima-
tion procedures. Often, an improper prior will be used as a non-
informative prior for variance terms. An improper prior is a prob-
ability distribution that does not sum or integrate to one. Because
it does not integrate or sum to one, it can technically not serve as
a probability distribution. Only five of the articles discussed con-
jugacy in detail (e.g., Ozechowski, 2014). In 22.8% of the articles,
all of the equations were provided. In another 22.2% the distribu-
tional form of the priors were provided so that the conjugacy can
be checked. Only 12 articles used uniform priors and most of the
other articles used (multivariate) normal priors for most of the
parameters of interest.
Overall, there is a wide variation of priors used in empirical
articles. However, it is striking that so many articles were not
completely transparent about the priors, the hyperparameters and
the level of informativeness of the prior used, as well as the source
for the informative priors.
Sensitivity analysis. If the prior is informative, and especially
when combined with small data, it might be useful to report a
sensitivity analysis. A sensitivity analysis can be helpful to illus-
trate how robust final model results are when priors are slightly (or
even greatly) modified; this provides a better understanding of the







































































































227THE USE OF BAYES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
role of the prior in the analysis. For more information about the
impact of priors on the results see Depaoli (2012, 2013) or van de
Schoot et al. (2015).
Based on the wording used by the original authors of the
articles, as reported above 30 empirical regression-based articles
used an informative prior. Of those, 12 (40%) reported a sensitivity
analysis; only three of these articles fully described the sensitivity
analysis in their articles (see, e.g., Gajewski et al., 2012; Matzke et
al., 2015). Out of the 64 articles that used uninformative priors, 12
(18.8%) articles reported a sensitivity analysis. Of the 73 articles
that did not specify the informativeness of their priors, three
(4.1%) articles reported that they performed a sensitivity analysis,
although none fully described it.
In contrast, there are also times when a sensitivity analysis is not
necessary when informative priors are implemented. Take the case
of the approximate zero for cross loadings or testing for measure-
ment invariance CFAs, as introduced in Muthén and Asparouhov
(2012; see also Moore, Reise, Depaoli, & Haviland, 2015; van de
Schoot et al., 2013), the informed prior is a specific setting in order
to create the approximate zero’s. In this case, the informed prior is
not really a “subjective” prior and a sensitivity analysis is not
necessary because this prior is being used in a confirmatory sense
as a model restriction. However, as showed by several authors who
did perform a sensitivity analysis in such situations (e.g., Chiorri,
Day, & Malmberg, 2014; Cieciuch, Davidov, Schmidt, Alge-
sheimer, & Schwartz, 2014; van de Schoot et al., 2013) the
posterior estimates of the latent means are influenced by different
specifications for the prior variances imposed on the approximate
zero priors.
In all, we hope that this information helps researchers to un-
derstand the importance of including a sensitivity analysis in
relevant applied contexts. Understanding the impact of the prior
and robustness of results is key in many empirical situations
implementing Bayes, and sensitivity analysis is a tool that can help
to derive this information.
Convergence. Examining and reporting on chain convergence
is very important in Bayesian statistics because results are only
trustworthy if the postburn-in portion of the MCMC chain(s) truly
converged. In 43.1% of the empirical articles, we could not find
any information on how (or whether) convergence was assessed. In
23.4% of the articles, convergence was only implicitly reported but
not directly assessed. For example, in an article it may be stated
that thousands of iterations were reported, or that only a visual
check was performed. In cases where convergence statistics were
reported, the Gelman-Rubin criterion (Gelman & Rubin, 1992)
was most often reported (26.9%). In fewer articles (6.6%), other
convergence criteria like the Geweke criterion (Geweke, 1991),
were reported.
Overall, we recommend that convergence criteria always be
reported to ensure that results are viable for each model param-
eter estimated.
Model fit. To quantify model fit in the context of posterior
predictive checking, posterior predictive p values (ppp-values) can
be computed (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2004). The model
test statistic, the chi-square value, based on the data is then
compared to the same test statistic computed for simulated (future)
data. Then, the ppp-value is defined as the proportion of chi-square
values obtained in the simulated data that exceed that of the actual
data. Ppp-values around .50 indicate a well-fitting model. Ppp-
values were reported in 32 articles (19.2%), but it highly depends
on the statistical technique used whether the ppp-value is (by
default) available. For example, 40.9% of the SEM articles re-
ported the ppp-values, whereas 96% of the articles using analysis
of variance did not report the ppp-value.
Overall, the posterior predictive p value is not used as a
standard tool to evaluate the fit of a model.
Model selection. Within the Bayesian framework typically
two ways of model selection is used: (a) by means of the Bayes
Factor (BF; Kass & Raftery, 1995), which was used in 18.5% of
the articles (but in 60.9% of the analyses of variance articles); and
(b) the deviance information criterion (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin,
& van der Linde, 2002) which is reported in 22.8% of the articles
(but in 38.6% of the SEM articles). We discuss both in some more
detail below.
Bayes factors. The first way in which BFs can be applied, is
to use them as an alternative to classical null hypothesis testing
(e.g., Morey & Rouder, 2011; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, &
Province, 2012; Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman,
2010; Wetzels et al., 2011), which also includes applications
explicitly assessing the level of support of the null hypothesis
(Annis, Lenes, Westfall, Criss, & Malmberg, 2015; Matzke et al.,
2015). The second type of BFs are used for evaluating informative
hypotheses, with many technical articles (e.g., Hoijtink, 2001;
Klugkist, Laudy, & Hoijtink, 2005; Mulder et al., 2009), tutorials
(e.g., Hoijtink, Béland, & Vermeulen, 2014; Klugkist, Van Wesel,
& Bullens, 2011; van de Schoot et al., 2011), and applications
(e.g., Van Well, Kolk, & Klugkist, 2008; Wong & van de Schoot,
2012) published.
Many researchers argue that BFs are to be preferred over
p values, but as stated by Konijn, van de Schoot, Winter, and
Ferguson (2015) potential pitfalls of a Bayesian approach include
BF-hacking (cf., “Surely, God loves a Bayes Factor of 3.01 nearly
Figure 4. Wordcloud showing terms used to describe the level of infor-






































































































228 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
as much as a BF of 2.99”). This can especially occur when BF
values are small. Instead of relying on a single study to draw
substantive inferences, we advocate that replication studies and
Bayesian updating are still necessary to draw conclusions (see
also, Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit,
2012). A good example of “updating” is the article of Van Den
Hout et al. (2014), who reanalyzed data from Gangemi, Mancini,
and van den Hout (2012) to compute Bayes Factors, after which
they replicated the original study and updated the original Bayes
Factors with new findings. There are more authors who used the
idea of updating (see also Boekel et al., 2015; Donkin, Averell,
Brown, & Heathcote, 2009; Hasshim & Parris, 2015; Montague,
Krawec, Enders, & Dietz, 2014; Neyens, Boyle, & Schultheis,
2015), for example, they aimed to replicate results across multiple
data sets within one study (de Leeuw & Klugkist, 2012; Dry,
2008), or they used Study 1 as prior information for Study 2 within
one article (Milfont & Sibley, 2014). Furthermore, Annis et al.
(2015) reanalyzed a study by Dennis, Lee, and Kinnell (2008),
itself a Bayesian application, and showed that their findings were
actually inconclusive and debatable. Van de Schoot et al. (2014)
concluded, after updating the results over four data sets, that
updating prior knowledge with new data leads to more certainty
about the outcomes of the final analyses and brings more confi-
dence in the conclusions.
Bayes factors as an alternative to hypothesis testing is advo-
cated in many articles. However, this approach is not yet prevalent
in empirical articles. It appears from our search that there are
currently more tutorials on this topic compared to actual appli-
cations. However, we believe that this trend will shift and that the
field will begin to see more applications implementing BFs in this
manner, including “updating” articles.
Deviance information criterion. The DIC can be used to
compare competing models, similar to the AIC (Akaike, 1981) and
BIC (Schwarz, 1978). The posterior DIC is proposed in Spiegel-
halter et al. (2002) as a Bayesian criterion for minimizing the
posterior predictive loss. It can be seen as the error that is expected
when a statistical model based on the observed dataset is applied
to a future dataset. The loss function of a future dataset is given the
expected a posteriori estimates of the model parameters based on
the observed dataset. If it was possible to know the true parameter
values, then the loss function could be computed. However, be-
cause these are unknown, the DIC takes the posterior expectation
where the first term is comparable with the fit part of the AIC and
BIC. The second term is often interpreted as the “effective number
of parameters,” but is formally interpreted as the posterior mean of
the deviance minus the deviance of the posterior means. Just like
with the AIC and BIC, models with a lower DIC value should be
preferred and indicates the model that would best predict a repli-
cate dataset, which has the same structure as that currently ob-
served.
Tutorial and Software Articles
One important component we discovered during this systematic
review was that many different types of tutorial articles have been
published on a variety of Bayesian features and software programs.
In order to provide a concise list of these resources, we have
created a table in the online material breaking down the 100
tutorial articles by content area and listing the relevant references.
We have also done this for Bayesian-specific software programs
that have been described in the literature. We acknowledge that our
search was not specifically geared toward software, so it is prob-
able we are missing some developments in this area that occurred
outside of (or even within) psychology. However, we still hope
this index can be useful for new users of Bayesian methods.
Trends Across Categories
Bayes’s Theorem in Cognitive Psychology
Bayes’s theorem plays a major role in the field of cognitive
psychology in various ways. See Lee’s (2011) article published in
a special issue of the Journal of Mathematical Psychology for an
excellent overview of the ways in which Bayes’s theorem is used
within cognitive psychology. In short, there are three main ways
Bayes’s theorem is currently applied within cognitive psychology.
First, it is used as a theoretical framework for how the mind makes
inferences about the world. These models are strictly used as a
theoretical explanation for human reasoning and behavior. It may
seem counterintuitive, but the data are still analyzed with tradi-
tional, frequentist methods. Lee states that the Bayesian frame-
work has gained in popularity since the start of the 21st century.
Our findings support this conclusion (see Figure 5A, green area).
While there were some articles published before the year 2000, this
application of Bayes’s theorem really took off from 2003 onward.
Some recent examples of this application of Bayes’s theorem are:
Gopnik, Griffiths, and Lucas (2015); Juslin, Nilsson, Winman, and
Lindskog (2011); and Kinoshita and Norris (2012; see also Table
1, “Bayes as cognition/learning”).
A second use of Bayesian methods in cognitive psychology is
through Bayesian hierarchical modeling. These models attempt to
relate models of psychological processes to actual data. Bayesian
hierarchical modeling allows the researcher to create a detailed,
concrete model of the processes that are assumed to be part of the
human thinking process and to compare predictions of behavior
from this model with observed data of actual human behavior. If
the model is able to adequately predict the actual data, then this
tells us something about the mechanisms that precede the observed
behavior. As Figure 5A shows (blue area), the use of these com-
putational hierarchical Bayesian models has increased after 2006,
closely following the trend of Bayes’ as a theoretical framework
for cognition. Some recent examples of this application of Bayes’s
theorem are: Ferreira, Castelo-Branco, and Dias (2012); Lee and
Sarnecka (2011); and Scheibehenne and Studer (2014; see also,
Table 1, “Computational model”).
A third use of Bayesian methods in cognitive psychology is
through the direct application of Bayesian statistics on observed
data. Lee (2011, p. 1) concludes: “It seems certain that Bayesian
statistics will play a progressively more central role in the way
cognitive psychology analyzes its data.” In our search, we have
indeed found some articles that directly apply Bayesian statis-
tics to cognitive data. For example, Andrews, Vigliocco, and
Vinson (2009) used a Bayesian ANOVA to analyze various
computational models based on cognitive theory about how
humans learn semantic representations. Voorspoels, Navarro,
Perfors, Ransom, and Storms (2015) applied Bayesian t tests to
compare two experimental conditions on word-generalization,
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Figure 5. Development of articles using Bayes’ using various statistical models/techniques. See the online






































































































230 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
archical Bayesian model and Bayes Factors to investigate con-
trast effects in category learning. Furthermore, Steyvers, Lee,
and Wagenmakers (2009) used Bayes Factors to compare four
models of learning, of which one was based on the theoretical
“Bayesian learner.” Finally, Sims, Neth, Jacobs, and Gray
(2013) created a rational-learner model and used Bayesian
methods to investigate melioration, or choosing a lesser, short-
term gain over a greater, long-term gain. These articles are
included under “Regression-based” articles in Table 1.
In conclusion, Bayes’s theorem plays an important role in
cognitive psychology, and its main application is slowly changing
from a theoretical framework to an actual method for estimating
models.
Item Response Theory
Within the category “regression-based models,” IRT has ar-
guably been the largest area within psychology (and related
fields) where Bayesian statistics has surfaced. The use of
MCMC for estimating IRT-based models dates back at least to
the technical articles of Albert (1992); Jannarone, Yu, and
Laughlin (1990); and Tsutakawa and Johnson (1990). More
accessible articles on IRT include Geerlings, Laros, Tellegen,
and Glas (2014); Ip (2010); Sinharay (2005); Wainer, Wang,
Skorupski, and Bradlow (2005); and Wang, Chen, and Jin
(2015). Out of all of the technical articles we discovered, 30.3%
were based on IRT modeling, making it the largest modeling
group represented in this category of technical articles. IRT also
had a large presence in the Bayesian simulation literature.
One-third of all simulation articles were based on IRT models.
Only 8.9% of the applied Bayesian articles used IRT tech-
niques. These trends are displayed in Figure 5B, where it can be
seen that a larger number of Bayesian IRT articles were pub-
lished in all three categories (theoretical, simulation, and ap-
plication) as time progressed.
It is surprising that the relatively large proportion of Bayesian
technical and simulation articles dealing with IRT was not mim-
icked in the applications published.
Structural Equation Modeling
Figure 5C presents trends for theoretical, simulation, and appli-
cation articles implementing Bayesian SEM. Within the technical
articles (16.2%) and the simulation articles (25.8%), SEM is the
second most common type of statistical model used following
closely behind IRT models. However, within applications it is the
number one statistical model used (26.0%). When inspecting Fig-
ure 5C, we can see that there is a steep increase in the number of
articles published in all three of these categories over time. How-
ever, it is striking that the number of Bayesian SEM applications
has experienced a dramatic spike since about 2012. This is in
contrast with the technical and simulation articles, which have
been published at a relatively steady rate over the last several years
of the assessment.
It appears that the presence of Bayesian SEM continues to grow
in all three areas, but that we may expect to see a faster increase
in the number of applications in the coming years.
Hierarchical/Multilevel
The next most common statistical method within technical
(13.5%) and empirical articles (26%) is multilevel modeling (ex-
cluding hierarchical IRT models; these are categorized in IRT; see
Figure 5D). We found hardly any simulation studies (3%) on this
topic; we suspect that the simulation studies on Bayesian multi-
level modeling are published outside the field of psychology, see
for example Hox, van de Schoot, and Matthijsse (2012). Note that
in the literature, multilevel modeling is also called hierarchical
modeling, random effects modeling, variance component model-
ing, contextual analysis, mixed linear modeling, and many other
variations. All of these forms make use of the fact that the data
have a nested structure.
In all, there is a steady increase of articles using Bayesian
multilevel modeling in an application context.
Regression/Analysis of Variance
A notable portion of empirical articles used univariate linear
regression models (10.7%) or analysis of variance (13.6%), while
hardly any of the technical (1.1%) or simulation articles (5.6%) we
found focused on these statistical models (see Figure 5E). One
possibility for this lack of technical and simulation articles could
be the timing of our review. Regression and analysis of variance
models are decidedly less-complex and more established in the
literature compared with some of the other models we have re-
ported on. It could be that the development of Bayesian estimation
for these models occurred in the literature predating our search
years.
Computerized Adaptive Testing
A field that received a growing amount of attention in technical
(8.1%) and simulation articles (12.6%) is CAT (see Figure 5F).
Bayesian applications of CAT, however, are sparsely published
(1.8%). We found only three such articles in our search: Jones
(2014) published a full Bayesian application, whereas O’Donell
and Colombo (2011) and Tong, Mao, and Goldreich (2013) merely
used CAT in the methods section.
In conclusion, Bayesian methods have been (sparsely) applied
to CAT for many years, and we expect that trend to continue.
Small Samples
The focus of using Bayesian methods in small sample contexts
is increasing for simulation articles, as well as the number of
regression based applications (see Figure 5G). There is a certain
appeal of Bayesian methods to researchers who only have access
to a relatively small number of participants or cases. In general, the
more information a researcher can specify (via the prior) before
seeing the data, the smaller the sample size needed to obtain the
same certainty compared to an analysis without specifying any
prior knowledge. Or as stated by Rouder, Sun, Speckman, Lu, and
Zhou (2003, p. 589):
. . . for small sample sizes, there is an occasional tendency for the ML
estimates to be unreasonably extreme. In contrast, by borrowing
strength across participants, Bayes estimation “shrinks” extreme es-
timates. The results are that the Bayes estimators are more accurate






































































































231THE USE OF BAYES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
An attractive feature is that priors can be used in a variety of
ways: to have an influence, a tiny influence, or virtually no
influence at all; as is nicely summarized by Baldwin and Felling-
ham (2013, p. 162):
Even if researchers are comfortable with a prior distribution, they may
insist on using flat or diffuse priors. As the simulation study demon-
strated, when sample sizes are small flat priors can influence results
and lead to additional bias and decreased efficiency. Indeed, diffuse
priors can be unnecessarily inefficient if the priors imply that math-
ematically possible but extreme outcomes are equally probable to
nonextreme values or if the priors ignore existing evidence. Con-
sequently, we recommend that researchers devote the necessary
time and effort to construct plausible, thoughtful priors that incor-
porate existing information about a research area. Like any aspect
of the research process, the details of the prior distributions as well
as the methods used to select them should be well described and
justified in a research report.
We found 37 simulation articles that examined the performance
of Bayesian methods in small samples; this represented 18.7% of
the Bayesian simulation articles identified in the search. The types
of models these articles focused on were the following: SEM
(45.9%), IRT (18.9%), multilevel modeling and CAT were tied
(8.1%), regression (2.7%), and other miscellaneous model types
(16.2%). Within these articles, the performance of Bayes varied
depending on the sample size. However, many of the articles
reported improvements relative to, for example, ML estimation
when sample sizes were small. Note that “small” samples sizes
varied drastically depending on the models being examined. For
example, Kieftenbeld and Natesan (2012) found that the graded
response IRT model improved in parameter recovery with samples
as small as 75. Mediation model analyses reported sample sizes as
small as 25 and still found an improvement (Yuan & MacKinnon,
2009). Improved estimates were also reported in multilevel CFAs
with only 10–20 clusters (Hox, Moerbeek, Kluytmans, & van de
Schoot, 2014; Hox et al., 2012).
It is not surprising that we found many simulation articles
stating that informative priors improve parameter estimates to a
greater degree than uninformative (or diffuse) priors. This finding
is likely because the informative priors usually contained correct
information about the parameter. We found nine simulation arti-
cles detailing how informative priors aided in proper estimation
(e.g., accuracy and efficiency) for a variety of model-types. Within
the simulation studies, it is emphasized that prior distributions
should be composed with care (as is argued in, e.g., Gao & Chen,
2005), because small sample results are so easily affected. In this
respect, Baldwin and Fellingham (2013) also suggested that re-
searchers invest time and effort to incorporate existing information
into prior distributions. They found that flat and diffuse priors can
affect results, increase bias, and reduce efficiency. As is shown in
Lee, Song, and Tang (2007), among several other articles, speci-
fying inaccurate priors for small data can result in estimates not as
good as those that were obtained with the more accurate prior
inputs. Thus, priors should be chosen with care, but luckily already
even mildly informative priors can be used effectively to obtain
estimates for small samples. As argued by Natesan (2015)
There is no magical cure for lack of information. However, when a
researcher is faced with small sample ordinal data Bayesian estima-
tion provides reasonable point and interval estimates.
We found 18 empirical articles that cited using Bayesian meth-
ods for small sample size issues. The range of sample sizes we
found were: 23 for an SEM model (Ozechowski, 2014), and up to
1,000 for a mixed logit model (Choi et al., 2008). The majority
(42.1%) of them used uninformative or weak priors, with another
26.3% using software default settings which are also uninforma-
tive in most (if not all) cases. Some articles (10.5%) did not
mention the informativeness of the priors, and empirical Bayes,
informative priors, hyperpriors, and informative but weak priors
were each used in 5.3% of the articles.
In sum, given the strong impact of priors in small sample
situations, as demonstrated by the simulation studies, small sample
studies should be especially clear about specific hyperparameters.
In addition, sensitivity analyses are highly recommended.
To examine whether there are follow-up efforts for replication
or cross-validation of articles that cite small sample size as the
reason to adopt a Bayesian approach, we used the following
method. First, we searched for the original article through Google
Scholar, and then we selected the articles that cited the original
article (n  246 citations). Within this list, we then searched for
articles mentioning “replic” somewhere in the text. We subse-
quently read all of the flagged articles (n  68 citations, linked to
12 of our small sample articles identified) to see whether they were
attempting to replicate the original article.
Our findings show that only three of the small sample articles
were used as the basis for a replication study. In all cases, it
concerned a conceptual replication. First, the study by Freisthler
and Weiss (2008) was conceptually replicated in an unpublished
manuscript (Freisthler & Martin, 2010). The authors write in their
discussion: “This is the first study to attempt to replicate findings
of outlet density and maltreatment in a state other than California
and the first to do so in a largely rural state.” (p. 11). Second, the
study by Kunreuther, Silvasi, Bradlow, and Small (2009) was
conceptually replicated in the same year by Gong, Baron, and
Kunreuther (2009). The replication study found substantively dif-
ferent results regarding the outcome of cooperation in a gaming
situation. Third, the study by Imel et al. (2011) was conceptually
replicated by Owen et al. (2015). The authors write in their
discussion: “[t]he current study replicated and extended
findings. . . . These findings are consistent with the previous
studies examining counselor variability in racial/ethnic disparat-
ies” (p. 7).
Given the recent call on increasing replication within psychol-
ogy (Asendorpf et al., 2013), we reiterate that this is also an
important topic to address within Bayesian statistics especially
when sample size are small.
Controversy Between Bayesians and Frequentists
Finally, our search uncovered several different articles written
from a Bayesian viewpoint that seek to criticize frequentist meth-
ods. Although Bayesians and frequentist statisticians have been
publishing in parallel to one another for decades, there has been a
good deal of crossover-criticism from both sides. These branches
of statistics have a history rooted in controversy due to fundamen-
tal differences in philosophical views. This controversy is nicely






































































































232 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
As embarrassing as it is to us as Bayesians, we have effectively
derived an orthodox null hypothesis test for feature coherence. We
apologize. (Navarro & Perfors, 2010, Footnote 7)
Besides correcting the most obvious flaws of NHST in a manner
reminiscent of how meta-analysis does it, Bayesian statistics can be
seen as providing answers to the questions researchers would be
asking, unless they had first been taught a flawed method. (Sohlberg
& Andersson, 2005, p. 69)
Occasionally, the tension between these sides of statistics results
in a series of publications. One example resides in the discussion
between the research group led by Bem (Bem, 2011; Bem, Utts, &
Johnson, 2011) and the group of Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Bors-
boom, and van der Maas (2011). Bem (2011) originally published
a study on nine experiments, where he attempted to demonstrate
the existence of psi (future events retroactively affecting people’s
responses) using frequentist statistics. Wagenmakers et al. (2011)
reanalyzed their data using a Bayesian t test and concluded that the
evidence in favor of psi was weak-to-nonexistent. Bem et al.
(2011) reanalyzed the data again by claiming Wagenmakers et al.
(2011) used an unrealistic prior distribution for their analyses;
Wagenmakers et al. (2012) replied again and also other Bayesians
joined the discussion (dis)agreeing with the methods used not only
in the original Bem study, but also used in the Wagenmaker
article—see Hoijtink, van Kooten, and Hulsker (2016b); Morey,
Wagenmakers, and Rouder (in press); Hoijtink, van Kooten, and
Hulsker (2016a), and Stern (2016)—and so the story continues.
These examples highlight the continued debate over philosoph-
ical issues underlying frequentist and Bayesian methods and
within the Bayesian field, such as the impact and use of prior
knowledge within the estimation process.
Discussion
This is an exciting time, where we can watch the field of applied
statistics change more than ever before. The way in which re-
searchers think about and answer substantive inquiries is slowly
taking on a new philosophical meaning that now incorporates
previous knowledge and opinions into the estimation process. We
began this article with a quote from Kruschke (2011; as forecasted
by Lindley) indicating that we would likely see a rise in Bayesian
applications in this century. Our systematic review attempted to
assess whether this statement was valid, and if a rise in the use of
Bayesian methods was evident based on publication patterns. Our
findings showed that there was some merit in this thought. In fact,
the use of Bayesian methods in applied Psychological work has
steadily increased since the nineties and is currently taking flight.
It was clear in this review that Bayesian statistics is used in a
variety of contexts across subfields of psychology and related
disciplines. There are many different reasons why one might
choose to use Bayes. For example, one might use Bayesian meth-
ods for: the use of priors, estimating otherwise intractable models,
circumventing small sample size issue, and so forth. Some re-
searchers may even choose to use Bayesian methods for modeling
uncertainty in the model (e.g., through Bayesian model averaging).
Ultimately, the use of Bayes has increased and broadened in the
sense that this methodology can be used in a flexible manner to
tackle many different forms of questions.
The relatively slow growth in popularity of Bayesian methods
up to around the year 2010 might be due to several reasons. First,
the traditional statistical approach being taught to psychologists is
to think in terms of the null hypothesis. Psychologists have largely
been married to their null hypotheses, and they often design studies
in terms of a point-null hypothesis. Moreover, many psychologists
make use of experiments in combination with rather straightfor-
ward analyses, for which you may not need to leave the frequentist
environment. Fields that implement very complex optimization/
integration problems are more prone to the Bayesian concept as
another way to approach statistical problems, making Bayesian
methods more of the norm in those fields. All of this is to say that
there may be many different reasons why psychologists have
seemingly lagged behind in the use of Bayesian statistics com-
pared with some fields. It could be that psychologists do not
readily identify situations in which the use of Bayesian methods
may be beneficial. Relatedly, it might be that it is rather involved
to actually use Bayesian methods for the uninitiated researcher, or
that Bayesian statistics as a practice is not user-friendly.
Using Bayesian methods also requires the generation of knowl-
edge, and many psychological researchers may not be familiar
thinking this way. For example, thinking of parameters in terms of
distributions, or specifying priors, are topics many users may not
usually consider during statistical analysis. We feel there has
traditionally been a lack of exposure to Bayesian statistics within
applied psychological fields. This issue of exposure can, in part, be
solved to some degree with building user-friendly software. How-
ever, even then, as you move away from simple models with
uninformative priors, the user has to have more in-depth knowl-
edge of the Bayesian process. In other words, it is a combination
of making Bayes accessible, as well as educating future genera-
tions of researchers about these methods in detail.
In this sense, we are faced with a “catch-22” as we move
forward. Bayes gets more interesting as you move toward more
complex modeling contexts, and these contexts are advantageous
to use as teaching tools to show the power and impact of Bayesian
statistics. However, these sorts of situations are also linked to more
complicated software components, which make it much harder to
start with for the novice Bayesian researcher. Luckily there is a
steady increase of very accessible textbooks (see, e.g., Gill, 2014;
Kaplan, 2014; Kruschke, 2014; Lunn, Jackson, Best, Thomas, &
Spiegelhalter, 2012; Lynch, 2007), articles gently introducing
Bayes (see the online material for 107 of such articles), checklists
on what to report (Depaoli & van de Schoot, 2015; Pullenayegum,
Guo, & Hopkins, 2012; Spiegelhalter, Myles, Jones, & Abrams,
2000; Sung et al., 2005), as well as courses offered all around the
world that assist researchers in becoming involved.
These new resources aimed at being user-friendly for novice
users might explain the huge increase of empirical articles pub-
lished since 2010 (and especially applications since 2014). That is,
training in Bayesian methods appears to have slowly become a
standard part of the statistical toolkit of researchers working in the
field of psychology. From an educational perspective, universities
should develop a statistics curriculum that more evenly includes
frequentist and Bayesian methods, giving students the option of
working with both early on and deciding for themselves which
method they would like to apply in their own research.
We feel education and exposure is the single biggest issue






































































































233THE USE OF BAYES IN THE LAST 25 YEARS
Bayesian methods is on the rise, we (the field) also need to
continue to develop our understanding of how methods perform.
Our findings (see Figure 4) show that technical articles, simulation
articles, and applications are not published at the same rate. For
several subdisciplines, technical and simulation articles are being
published at a faster rate compared to applications. However, this
pattern of results is typical for methods being newly adopted into
a field. This pattern is typically found in fields where Bayes is seen
as a cognitive process, which is translated into a Bayesian com-
putational model. However, in these cases, most of the actual data
analyses are done with frequentist statistics. We also see a higher
rate of Bayesian technical and simulation articles being published
in the fields of IRT and CAT. This is interesting because it shows
that the methodological literature is out-pacing the applied litera-
ture. It may be that there is relatively more methodological
interest in Bayes in psychology compared with applications. We
encourage experts in Bayesian statistics to support/coauthor
applications. When they do so, they should become role models
in adequate reporting. Producing more quality applications
within different subfields of psychology will help to broaden
the usage and demonstrate proper implementation of Bayesian
methods.
Bayesian statistics follows its own rules since there are
elements included in the Bayesian framework that are funda-
mentally different from frequentist settings. Perhaps one of the
more alarming findings from our review was that there appears
to be a low proportion of articles published that properly report
important issues surrounding Bayesian estimation (e.g., the
source and specification of the priors, etc.). In any science, it is
our duty to ensure that results are correct, reported accurately,
and (perhaps most importantly) reproducible. The absence of
information regarding convergence and the specification of
priors in studies utilizing Bayesian MCMC-based methods may
greatly hinder these goals. It is possible that as the use of Bayes
increases, the reporting of certain details may decrease. For
example, in articles that use ML estimation, proper convergence
of the estimation algorithm is usually assumed and not reported.
However, the nature of current Bayesian MCMC-based meth-
odology is such that reporting convergence (visually and
through diagnostics) is still arguably quite important, especially
because it is much more difficult a task of assessing conver-
gence in Bayes than converging to a point estimate (as in
frequentist methods).
Furthermore, reporting on priors will always be important be-
cause priors can fundamentally change the substantive results
obtained through the posterior. Unfortunately, there appears to be
a trend in psychology where some of the key features of Bayesian
methodology are either not being properly screened for, or perhaps
intentionally omitted at the behest of journal. This can only lead to
a decrease in the reproducibility of reported results, and in an
increase of confusion about the results that are reported using
Bayesian methods. For researchers concerned with reporting all
relevant details for their Bayesian analysis, see the online material
for a list of 50 articles we feel presented adequate details regarding
Bayesian estimation and results (see Depaoli & van de Schoot,
2015 for a related checklist for the reporting of Bayesian analysis).
While many editors and authors may omit such details in the
interest of manuscript length, there is no excuse in modern times
for not making such details available online—ideally as part of the
journal website or an official data storage with a DOI number. In
the online supplementary materials we provide a list of 45 articles,
which can serve as inspiration for how Bayesian statistics could be
reported. Most articles reported all specific information about
priors, convergence, and sensitivity analyses in the main text.
Others published an online appendix with this detailed informa-
tion.
Although many argue that Bayesian statistics solve issues en-
countered in frequentist statistics, Bayesian analyses are not im-
mune to phenomena related to the replication crisis in science,
which include questionable research practices (QRPs), or
p-hacking behavior. For example, to evaluate whether a BF can be
considered substantial, cut-off values for minimum BF-values are
proposed by Kass and Raftery (1995), but these values are not
meant as strict cut-off values. This issue is not unlike how p  .05
is often (mis)used. We argue strongly against using unjustified
cut-off values as decision rules within the Bayesian framework
because this might result in similar hacking-behavior as with p
values, called BF-hacking by Konijn et al. (2015). They state that
a BF of 3.01 should not be considered substantial compared with
a BF of 2.99, which would then be “not worth more than a bare
mention” (cf. Kass & Raftery, 1995). Konijn et al. (2015) “ad-
justed” the famous quote of Rosnow and Rosenthal: “. . . surely,
God loves the .06 nearly as much as the .05” (Rosnow &
Rosenthal, 1989, p. 1277), to the Bayesian framework: “God
would love a Bayes Factor of 3.01 nearly as much as a BF of 2.99.”
Study Limitations
Of course no study is without limitations. It is imaginable that
we have missed Bayesian articles in our review, simply because
they do not mention our search terms in their title, abstract, or
keywords. Another limitation could also be that we only used
Scopus as a search engine and could have therefore missed out on
some viable articles. Future research could possibly adjust the
search method applied by Rietbergen (under review), who used a
piece of software capable of searching within the article text via
the PubMed search engine. On the other hand, with our search
terms, we were as inclusive as possible and were able to identify
thousands of relevant articles; we even covered articles that did not
actually use any Bayesian methods in their study but simply
mentioned “Bayes.”
Another issue is that some of the trends detailed here may not be
unique to Bayesian statistics, but rather may reflect overall
changes in methodology. For example, we found that open access
journals are growing in Bayesian statistics, but they may also be
growing in popularity for other general statistical areas (Björk et
al., 2010). Given that our focus was strictly on the trends in
Bayesian statistics, we are not able to make full comparisons with
trends outside of Bayesian statistics. However, the trends that we
did uncover are key to understanding the role that Bayesian meth-
ods have been playing in the psychological literature.
Concluding Thoughts
In conclusion, we are optimistic about the increased use of
Bayesian methods. Much research has shown that there are
important benefits to using this estimation approach in psycho-






































































































234 VAN DE SCHOOT ET AL.
many other fields, is becoming a true alternative to frequentist
methods. State of the art Bayesian features are increasingly
used to explore new research possibilities, to seek out new
ideas, to answer new research questions, and to boldly go where
just few researchers have gone before. We would like to chal-
lenge psychological researchers to move beyond frequentist
methods, which were the dominant research tool of the 20th
century, and move toward the new statistics of the 21st century.
We believe that if applied researchers tend to the problematic
issues found in this review, future Bayesian work can be more
thorough, transparent, and replicable.
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